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I)E PAUL LAW REVIEW
If the limitation on the courts' transfer power is relaxed, the very thresh-
old of the federal courts will be "cluttered" with preliminary trials of
fact concerning the relative convenience of forums."4 This might pro-
duce the very kind of uncertainty, hardship, and delay which the minor-
ity in the instant cases sought to avoid.
''Ibid.
FEDERAL TAXATION-U.S. SUPREME COURT RULES
ON USEFUL LIFE AND SALVAGE VALUE
On the same day the United States Supreme Court considered three
federal taxation cases concerning the points of useful life and salvage
value. In the first case, petitioner was engaged in the business of leasing
and renting trucks and automobiles. The average holding period of the
trucks was thirty-nine months, and the automobiles were held for an
average of twenty-six months. J. Frank Connor, former owner, claimed
depreciation on a four year useful life using the straight line method for
the trucks and a hybrid method for the automobiles for the fiscal years
ending March 31, 1954, 1955, and 1956. Petitioner, successor to Connor,
filed amended income tax returns for the above stated years using the
declining balance method of depreciation, and claiming a refund. The
Commissioner disallowed the amended returns and this was upheld by
the Supreme Court of the United States. The Court held that the automo-
biles did not have a useful life of three years, required under section 167
(c) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code,' and that therefore, the declining
balance method of depreciation could not be employed. Although the
Court found the trucks to have the required useful life, it held that they
did not have a reasonable salvage value as required by Treasury Regula-
tion section 1.167 (b)-2.2 (The district court had previously held that
useful life is the period of use to a taxpayer in his trade or business and
that salvage value is inherent in the declining balance method.) Hertz
Corp. v. United States, 346 U.S. 122 (1960).
In the second case, taxpayers were engaged in the business of leasing
new automobiles. In the years 1950 and 1951, they leased numerous auto-
mobiles to Evans U-Drive, Inc., who in turn leased to the public. Tax-
payers claimed depreciation over a useful life of four years with no
1 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167(c): "Paragraphs (2), (3), and (4) of subsection (b)
shall apply only in the case of property ... with a useful life of 3 years. . .
2 Treas. Reg. § 1.167 (b)-2 (1956) provides: "Declining balance method- (a) Appli-
cation of method-. . . While salvage is not taken into account in determining the
annual allowances under this method, in no event shall an asset (or an account) be
depreciated below a reasonable salvage value ......
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salvage value under the straight line method. The average holding period
of the automobiles was seventeen months. The Commissioner claimed
useful life was seventeen months and salvage value was market value at
the end of the seventeen months. The Supreme Court of the United States
reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that
the Commissioner had used erroneous concepts of useful life and salvage
value, and ruled in favor of the Commissioner, stating that useful life
was the period of use by the taxpayer in his business, and that salvage
value was resale value at the time of disposal, and not junk value as
claimed by the taxpayer. Commissioner v. Evans, 346 U.S. 92 (1960).
In the third and final case, taxpayer was a Chrysler dealer who rented
new cars to a finance company, and assigned new cars to company of-
ficials. These cars were useful to the business for less than one year, and
straight line depreciation was taken on a useful life of three years. No
salvage value was allowed, and the cars were sold after their brief use
for more than their cost price. The years in dispute were 1950 and 1951.
The Commissioner claimed useful life was less than one year, and that
no depreciation should be taken because salvage value exceeded the orig-
inal cost. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rendered a decision
in favor of the Commissioner. The Supreme Court affirmed this decision,
using the same rationale as in the Evans case. Massey Motors Inc. V.
United States, 346 U.S. 92 (1960).
The Hertz case was decided under the 1954 Internal Revenue Code and
Evans and Massey were decided under the 1939 Internal Revenue Code.
The taxpayers contended that useful life is the economic life of an asset,
regardless of who the owner might be. The Commissioner contended
that useful life is the time in which the asset is actually used by one
taxpayer. Ordinarily, one cannot determine how long he will use the
asset, but in these cases, all knew that they would'hold their respective
assets for a period considerably shorter than their economic lives. The
government claimed that when an owner is reasonably certain that an
asset will not be kept until the end of its economic or physical life, he
must depreciate the asset over the expected holding period and account
for the salvage value as the expected market price at the time of disposal.
Taxpayers claimed depreciation over the physical life of the asset, and
accounted for salvage value as junk value after complete deterioration
of the asset. The taxpayers availed themselves of greater depreciation by
their method in that they did not have to account for a higher salvage
value upon disposal, since under this method salvage was only junk
value. This will allow the taxpayers to decrease ordinary income, sub-
ject to a maximum fifty-two per cent corporate income tax, and increase
capital gains, subject to a twenty-five per cent income tax.
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The three cases, as above indicated, were considered by the Supreme
Court at the same time. All dealt with the meaning of useful life and with
the requirement of salvage value at the end of useful life. The govern-
ment and the courts have been inconsistent in their application of "useful
life.' 3 Their present interpretation of useful life as the period during
which the taxpayer anticipates retaining the asset in the business, is not
without prior authority.4 However, in the past, the government and the
courts seem to have applied useful life as physical life more often than
as life to the individual. In 1927, the Board of Tax Appeals upheld the
government's contention that automobiles used in a business two to
three years had useful lives of four to five years.5 In 1956, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held, in reversing a tax court decision that
exposing property for sale does not change the character of the asset:
The essence of the tax court's alternative ground is that property changes
character merely by the fact of its being exposed for sale. We agree with the
taxpayer that such a concept is neither logical or reasonable.6
In 1959, the Commissioner asked for a four year useful life on rental
vehicles which were used in the taxpayer's business for periods varying
from twelve to sixteen months. A subsequent agreement between the
petitioner and the Commissioner stated that a four year useful life was
proper.7 In Herbert Schainberg,8 the government pleaded that physical
life and useful life are the same. They stated in their brief:
The physical life of the component parts of the buildings is a prime factor to
be considered in determining useful life of the assets. Presumably, unless other
factors are present which would reduce the physical life of an asset, there is
no reason why the physical life and the useful life would not be the same.9
3 In some instances, they have interpreted useful life as physical life of an asset
(Charlie Hillard, 31 T.C. 961 (1959)); while in other instances they have interpreted
useful life as expected life to an individual owner (United States v. Ludey, 274 U.S.
295 (1927)).
4 Detroit Edison Co. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 98 (1943); United States v. Ludey,
274 U.S. 295 (1927); Cohn v. United States, 259 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1958); St. Louis
Co. v. United States, 134 F. Supp. 411 (D. Del. 1955). These cases are substan-
tiated by Treas. Reg. S 1.167(a)-1(b) (1956), which provides: "Useful life-For the
purpose of section 167 the estimated useful life of an asset is not necessarily the useful
life inherent in the asset but is the period over which the asset may reasonably be ex-
pected to be useful to the taxpayer in his trade or businss or in the production of his
income. This period shall be determined by reference to his experience with similar
property taking into account present conditions and probable future developments ..
5 Whitman-Douglas Co., 8 B.T.A. 694 (1927); Max Kurtz, 8 B.T.A. 679 (1927).
6 Philber Equip. Corp. v. Commissioner, 237 F. 2d 129, 133 (3rd Cir. 1956).
7 Charlie Hillard, 31 T.C. 961 (1959).
833 T.C. Bk. No. 28 (1959). 9 Id. at 54.
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It would therefore appear that the position of the government in Hertz,
Evans, and Massey was not consistent with the line of reasoning followed
by the government in past decisions. 10
Salvage value determination is closely linked with the determination
of useful life. If useful life is the physical life of the asset, salvage value
will be junk value. However, if useful life is the period of use of a par-
ticular taxpayer in his trade or business, then salvage value is the esti-
mated resale value at the expected time of sale. The Court in the Hertz,
Evans, and Massey cases has held that salvage value must be reasonable
at all times, and that therefore an asset cannot be depreciated below a
reasonable salvage value. This appears to be a justifiable decision, and
one that should not be subject to an excessive amount of controversy.
There is considerable authority supporting the Commissioner's viewpoint
on salvage value." Hertz, Evans and Massey established that salvage value
must at all times be reasonable regardless of the depreciation method
used, and that the remaining salvage value in the declining balance equa-
tion is not necessarily a reasonable salvage value.
A major effect of the Court's decisions is that depreciation is to be
calculated over the estimated useful life of the asset while actually used
by the taxpayer, and not over the period of its economic life. Thus, a
taxpayer, when purchasing a new asset, will not be allowed the use of
the double declining balance and the sum of the year-digits depreciation
methods unless the asset is to be used by him in his trade or business for
at least three years.
The extent to which a taxpayer may avail himself of capital gains
treatment on depreciable assets intended for use during a shorter period
than physical life is reduced by the Court's decision on salvage value and
useful life. This is so because yearly depreciation deductions will be
reduced, thus increasing ordinary income, subject to a fifty-two per cent
tax, and book value will be increased, thus decreasing the capital gain on
the sales, subject to a twenty-five per cent tax.
It appears that legislation will eventually be passed to correct the in-
equities in the application of the capital gains provisions.12 A reasonable
treatment would be to record all gains on sales of depreciable personal
property as ordinary income, and thus eliminate the maneuvering of tax
experts to reap unwarranted benefits for their clients through the utiliza-
tion of the lower capital gains income tax rates. The enactment of such
10 The government's ideas are commendable because taxpayers such as Hertz, Evans,
and Massey, are not within the group intended to be benefited by the capital gains pro-
visions of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code.
II Cases cited note 7 supra.
2 Herbert Schainberg, 33 T.C. Bk. No. 28 (1959).
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legislation would allow the Commissioner to more readily accept tax-
payer judgment of useful life and salvage value, and hence depreciation
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code would be adhered to with
greater conformity by the taxpayer.
PATENTS-NEW CRITERION FOR DETERMINING
VALIDITY OF BROADENED CLAIMS IN
REISSUED PATENTS
Plaintiffs sued defendant for infringement of reissued patent No.
23,937, relating to a lapping machine. Plaintiffs asserted infringement of
six claims' which were identical to claims in the original patent, and also
alleged infringement of four new and broader claims which were added
by reissue. Defendant denied infringement of the six identical claims as
well as the four new and broader claims, and further asserted invalidity
of the reissued patent. The District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois held the six identical claims invalid for lack of invention and held
the four new and broader claims invalid because of public use of the
subject matter claimed therein for more than one year prior to the filing
date of the reissue application. 2 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the lower court's finding of invalidity as to the identical
claims, and also sustained its interpretation of those sections of the 1952
Patent Act relating to reissued patents,3 and thereby held that the four
new and broader claims' were invalid. This pronouncement established
that public use or sale of the subject matter defined in the claims of the
reissued patent for more than one year prior to the filing date of the re-
issue application invalidates those claims in the reissued patent which are
not identical to claims in the original patent. Crane Packing Co. v. Spit-
fire Tool & Machine Co., 276 F. 2d 271 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 363
U.S. 820 (1960).
The holding of the court of appeals which is a substantial limitation, if
not a total nullification of the law relating to reissued patents, establishes
1 The function of claims in a patent was considered by the Supreme Court in Motion
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917), wherein it is stated:
"The scope of every patent is limited to the invention described in the claims contained
in it, read in the light of the specification. These so mark where the progress claimed by
the patent begins and where it ends that they may have been aptly likened to the descrip-
tion in a deed, which sets the bounds to the grant which it contains. It is to the claims
of every patent, therefore, that we must turn when we are seeking to determine what
the invention is, the exclusive use of which is given to the inventor by the grant pro-
vided for by the statute, 'He can claim nothing beyond them.'" Id. at 510.
2 Crane Packing Co. v. Spitfire Tool & Machine Co., 177 F. Supp. 927 (N.D. III. 1959).
3 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 251-52 (Supp. 1959).
